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I. Management summary 
The P2P lending market has significantly increased during the last few years. In 
Switzerland, the credit volume has more than doubled in just one year. However, in an 
international comparison China and the United Kingdom take on the leading position in 
the booming market. Analysts predict that the P2P loan market reaches one trillion U.S 
dollars by the year 2050. Apart from that, the introduction of alternative credit provision 
challenges the traditional financing models. Hence, there must be several benefits for 
preferring a P2P loan instead of applying and investing via the traditional way. Despite 
the benefits, the recent developments have revealed risks which potentially have far-
reaching consequences. The global credit market cannot afford to ignore the influence 
of the P2P lending and therefore a deep understanding of the underlying processes and 
potentials are required. Therefore, this thesis investigates the attributes of marketplace 
lending and whether the risks outweigh the chances for key stakeholders. 
 
In order to answer the research question, the thesis follows a qualitative approach. 
Existing literature is reviewed, compared and extended through a back and forth theory 
search. Furthermore, an interview with the Swiss platform Cashare was conducted. Due 
to the increased popularity and pressure of crowdlending platforms, it was not possible 
to conduct further interviews. Nevertheless, based on the literature review scenarios and 
assumptions are elaborated in order to carefully evaluate opportunities and risks for the 
three key stakeholders. 
 
The findings demonstrate high profitable returns on a low-cost basis as main benefits 
for investors. However, high returns simultaneously imply higher risks such as credit 
and platform risks, which are valued to be the most significant. Borrowers, which 
represents the counterpart, are profiting from an inexpensive and convenient financing 
alternative. Debtors are not directly involved in risks but rather affected by uncertainties 
occurring from the market or the platform. The decentralization of credit risks, low-cost 
structure and automated processes are valued to be competitive advantages for a P2P 
platform. However, the big data approach used for the credit assessment as well as the 
cost structure first need to prove their potential during a full economic cycle. Besides 
that, a marketplace lender primarily has to deal with reputational and operational risks. 
Nevertheless, market risks are of major concern due to the fact that a recession could 
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affect a platform more than expected. Additionally, trust was identified to be the 
cornerstone in the P2P market and is enhanced through regulatory regimes. 
 
To mitigate the risks, investors are advised to diversify and to assess a risk-return 
profile of their investments whereas platforms should introduce contingency plans. Due 
to the novelty of the P2P market the thesis highlights several future research directions. 
Overall, the future will reveal whether marketplace lending disrupts the credit market or 
if it is just a current trend. The preconditions, however, are in favor of the former 
scenario. 
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1. Introduction 
The introduction of this thesis gives a short overview of 1.1 motivation and aim of the 
thesis, 1.2 research question, 1.3 an overview of the structure, 1.4 problem definition 
and 1.5 the limitation of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Motivation and aim of the thesis 
Peer-to-Peer lending is currently a hot topic when it comes to investments and lending. 
The motivation to investigate in such a topic is derived from the author’s interest in the 
credit market and its mechanism. Where traditional financial institutions dominate the 
market, it is interesting to analyze if there is potential to disrupt traditional business 
models. The aim of the thesis is to find the main opportunity and risk factors for key 
stakeholders in order to find possible comparative advantages and weaknesses. In doing 
so, the thesis examines if the risks outweigh the benefits. 
 
1.2 Research question 
The research question is formulated as follows: What is the mechanism behind 
marketplace lending and what kind of chances and risks does it involve for key 
stakeholders? 
 
1.3 Overview of structure 
After this introduction, the thesis comprises five major chapters. Firstly, chapter 2 
theoretical framework, delves into the peer-to-peer lending literature where the terms 
stakeholders and various P2P lending types are defined. Additionally, a comparison to 
the traditional banking model, lending model and the regulatory framework is 
explained. As the main part of the literature review opportunities and risks for investors, 
borrowers and the platform are examined. This provides the basis for further analysis in 
chapter 4. Prior to that, chapter 3 methodology, gives valuable clues about the different 
approaches used as well as a justification. The practical framework (chapter 4) foremost 
evaluates different stakeholders according to their interests, influence, position and 
impact in order to find key groups. Afterward, the opportunities and risks for each key 
party is rated according to its importance, respectively impact or competitive advantage. 
It is therefore possible to give reasoning if the risks outweigh the rewards in 
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marketplace lending. A critical discussion is made in chapter 5 and conclusions are 
drawn in chapter 6. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
This thesis is based on a qualitative approach for answering the research question. 
Specifically, existing literature is used and compared. Furthermore, a short interview 
with the Swiss platform Cashare was conducted. Due to the increased popularity and 
pressure of crowdlending platforms, it was difficult to conduct interviews with other 
platforms. In addition, due to the novelty of the market quantitative data was hardly 
accessible. Nevertheless, based on a back and forth theory search and the elaboration of 
scenarios and assumptions a careful and detailed qualitative analysis has been 
composed. 
 
1.5 Problem definition 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending has significantly increased on a global scale during the last 
few years (Claessens, Frost, Turner, & Zhu, 2018, p. 1). According to the 2018 
Crowdlending Survey (Dietrich, Amrein, von der Heyde, Heuermann, & Rüdisühli, p. 
8), the Swiss crowdlending market has more than doubled in 2017 compared to the 
previous year (CHF 55.1 Million to CHF 186.7 Million). The majority of the financing 
is attributed to small and medium enterprises (SME) followed by consumers and real 
estate. However, in an international comparison, Switzerland has by far not the leading 
position. With a year-on-year growth of 112% (2016) China is the market leader when it 
comes to P2P lending, followed by the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) 
(Dietrich et al., 2018, p. 12; Xu, Zheng, Xu, & Wang, 2016, p. 1). In addition, the 
overall crowdlending market volume is forecasted to reach one trillion U.S dollars by 
the year 2050, which indicates a booming market (Nunatak, n.d.). FinTech credits offer 
alternative financing to clients which have limited access to financing sources 
(Claessens et al., 2018, p. 1). Unlike commercial banks, the platforms decentralize the 
risks by transferring it to the investors (Lenz, 2018, p. 1). Therefore, FinTech 
companies challenge the traditional banking model and attract investors and creditors 
with profitable rates and a fast procedure through automatization (Lend, n.d.-a). 
However, this untried fast-growing market can also bear some risks, which could have 
substantial impacts on the economy since capital raising seems to shift from traditional 
banks to P2P lenders. The questions emerging from these developments demand a 
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deeper insight into the P2P lending process and awareness about the chances and risks 
involved. Additionally, questions whether the traditional banking model will be 
disrupted in the future or whether it will still be reliable emerges. 
 
1.6 Limitation 
The main limitations are mentioned in this chapter, however, within the thesis, there are 
further limitations noted. Due to its novelty of the peer-to-peer lending market, it was 
decided to focus on general aspects of the market and therefore country- or cultural-
specific characteristics are neglected. In addition, knowledge or experience differences 
of various investors and borrowers are not considered. Concerning platforms, eight 
different platforms are included with a main focus of Swiss providers. A common 
attribute of those platforms is the decentralization of the credit risk respectively, credit 
risks as off-balance sheet positions in their books. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
This chapter 2 theoretical framework addresses the description and understanding of the 
peer-to-peer lending process in general. In the course of this, the different expressions 
are defined (2.1) in a first step, followed by 2.2 stakeholder map and 2.3 a comparison 
to the traditional bank lending characteristics. In 2.4 different types of P2P lending such 
as private, business, real estate and public sector loans are covered. After a basic 
understanding is provided an introduction into the 2.5 lending process is enclosed and 
with 2.6 regulatory issues are discussed. 2.7 and 2.8 provide valuable clues about the 




“Crowdlending describes the process of brokering debt capital between lenders and 
borrowers of capital online” (Dietrich et al., 2018, p. 6). “Marketplace lending relies on 
large-scale loan screening by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking 
paradigm” (Vallee & Zeng, 2018). According to Lin (2009) peer-to-peer lending is 
“where individual investors provide unsecured loans directly to individual borrowers 
without the intermediation of a bank” (p. 1). All the above statements describe the 
online lending process, however, different terms are used. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the various definition figure 1 aims at providing an overview. 
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The term peer-to-peer (P2P) was originally introduced in the IT sector where it 
describes the information exchange of different equated end users, regardless of size, 
within one network (Swisspeers AG, n.d.-b; Prime Meridian Capital Management, 
2015). However, considering the financial perspective the term crowdfunding or 
crowdlending is well established. Crowdfunding, which is the umbrella term, is a 
method where a crowd is supporting a single project based on the principle “the mass 
can procure more than a single person”. Concerning crowdlending the crowd, which 
consists of several individuals, are providing a specific amount of money to another 
person or institution. In return, the crowd receives a pre-agreed exchange value in the 
form of interest payments. In reality, there is not a huge difference between 
crowdlending and P2P lending and therefore it is often seen as synonyms (Swisspeers 
AG, n.d.-a; Swisspeers AG, n.d.-c). 
 
Shortly after the increasing popularity of crowdfunding, the term marketplace lending 
was established. Due to the fact that not only private individuals act as investors 
anymore but also small to medium size enterprises or large institutional corporations, 
the term peer-to-peer lending was no longer appropriate. Nevertheless, instead of 
defining it as business-to-peer lending or the other way around, the term marketplace 
lending covers all the possibilities (Dietrich et al., 2018, p. 6; Swisspeers AG, n.d.-c). 
The thesis, however, puts the three terms on an equal footing with each other and 
applies it as synonyms. 
 
2.2 Stakeholder map 
The following map (figure 2) helps to identify relevant stakeholder for P2P lending 
platforms based on Freeman’s approach (2004). Freeman defines stakeholders as any 
group or individual, who has influence or can influence a company’s objectives. 
Thereby, in determining significant groups a company can develop and implement 
strategies to deal with these units in order to keep track of the company’s purposes 
(Freeman, 2004, p. 229). Figure 2 gives an overview of internal and external 
stakeholders of a P2P lending platform. Later on, in the practical framework, chapter 4, 
main groups are valued according to their interests, power, position and impacts (table 
2) as well as arranged in a priority table (figure 12) in order to find key stakeholders. 
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Figure 2: Stakeholder map (Created by the author) 
 
Following Freeman’s definition, the following internal stakeholders are identified: 
owner, management and employees (Bachmann et al., 2011, p. 5). However, there is not 
much literature referring to internal factors of a P2P platform and therefore general 
considerations are taken into account. The owner is interested in maximizing the profit 
on a stable growth rate, an excellent top-down and bottom-up information flow as well 
as defining the direction of the company. The employees and management want to stay 
employed while they get honored for their work, e.g. financial or non-financial 
recognition as well as development possibilities. The management additionally focuses 
on sustainable growth of the business and a well-working communication flow 
(O’Shannassy, 2003, pp. 60–62; Schell, n.d.). 
 
Considering the external view, competitors, regulators, partners, and customers 
(borrowers and investors) are external stakeholders. Competitors are important 
stakeholders, especially in a young market. In the event of a competitor’s malpractice 
relating to the violation of regulation or poor assessment of borrower’s credit standing, 
it could have significant impacts on the company’s reputation. Also, the media has a 
great impact on the company’s esteem (Dietrich et al., 2018, p. 16). In addition, the 
regulator is an important driver in shaping the crowdlending environment. In 










External view Internal view 
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Swiss National Bank. More about specific regulatory issues are to be continued in 
chapter 2.6 regulatory issues. Furthermore, the government is interested in the business 
for paying taxes and truthful disclosure of its books (Schell, n.d.). Partnerships with 
banks, other P2P platforms or service providers are crucial strategic decisions in 
marketplace lending. According to a 2018 crowdlending survey 75% of the platforms 
are in favor to collaborate with banks, followed by 50% with start-ups and 33% with 
other crowdlending platforms (Dietrich et al., 2018, pp. 17–18). However, relational 
(inadequate inter-firm cooperation) or performance risks (fail to meet strategic goals) 
when aligning with a strategic partner can have significant negative effects (Zhou, 2005, 
p. 14). Borrowers are defined as private individuals, companies or public corporations, 
who are seeking additional financing. On the other hand, investors include private and 
institutional investors, e.g. private persons, trusts, funds, banks, insurances or family 
offices (Dietrich et al., 2018, p. 6; Loanboox, 2019). Investors also called lenders, and 
borrowers are the key counterparties for all platforms. The marketplace lender brings 
borrowers, who have different credit standing and are in need of capital, together with 
investors, who are seeking profitable investment opportunities. Both counterparties are 
to a certain extent powerful due to the fact that they are the essential elements in the 
business model. They might thereby form communities to push through their interests. 
Such influence on the business needs to be taken into consideration (Greiner & Wang, 
2009, p. 2; Herrero-Lopez, 2009, p. 1). Nevertheless, the thesis is not interested in 
developing business strategies to keep stakeholders on track but rather identifies them to 
analyze the business concepts’ strengths and weaknesses. 
 
2.3 Comparison to a traditional bank 
A comparison to the loan provided by a bank helps to better understand the business 
model of a peer-to-peer lending platform. This chapter identifies and explains three 
major differences, namely representation, risk position and fee model. 
 
A key difference between Fintech credit platforms and traditional banks is the 
representation of the company. Where banks have branches all over a country, the 
platforms are reaching out to their clients via online channels. Furthermore, client and 
credit application processes are fully automated, which allows dealing with big data. 
According to Claessens, Frost, Turner, and Zhu (2018) an Indian P2P platform indicates 
to screen more than 1’000 data points for assessing the credit rating (p. 5). Nonetheless, 
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banks do have access to other information sources such as saving or credit accounts as 
well as personal conversations. However, banks also started integrating high-end 
technologies but still not on the same level as Fintech companies do, due to multiple 
systems, data quality and consolidation problems (van Liebergen, 2017, p. 65). 
 
A fundamental attribute of Fintech companies is that the intermediation between debtor 
and investor occurs as an off-balance-sheet operation. Therefore, the platform does not 
take any position in their books and thus the credit risks such as term transformation, 
defaults or risk buffers are passed over to the investor. Nevertheless, there are some P2P 
platforms which are holding the credit positions in their books and therefore are acting 
as credit agents in the non-banking sector (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 4; Swisspeers AG, 
n.d.-c). However, the thesis focuses on Fintech companies with off-balance-sheet 
operations. 
 
As a consequence of using low-cost automated processes and not being affected by 
credit risks, P2P platforms are not forged to generate net interest margins. Instead, 
platforms are collecting fees and charges on the basis of an agent model. Therefore, 
marketplace lenders offer remunerative profits for investors and low interest rates for 
credit receivers, which in return makes an online investment more favorable compared 
to banks (Swisspeers AG, n.d.-c) 
 
2.4 Types of P2P lending 
There are four different types of crowdlending to be distinguished which refer to the 
investor’s investment preference. According to figure 3 marketplace lending is split into 
consumer, business, real estate, public sectors and large corporations crowdlending. 
 
Figure 3: Marketplace lending overview (Created by the author)  
Marketplace	lending
Private Business Real	Estate Public	sector	and	large	corporations
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2.4.1 Private 
The most common loans provided by a marketplace lender are probably private loans. 
Private loans target investments in personal finance such as home renovations, buying a 
new car, paying off credit card balances, health costs or debt consolidation. Flexibility 
and the struggle with high-interest rates are major reasons for private individuals to take 
on a loan via a P2P platform. A Swiss (CH) supplier of private loans is for example, 
Lend while in an international context, Lending Club in the United States (US) or Zopa 
in the United Kingdom (UK) are big players when it comes to private lending (Rose, 
2016; Lend, n.d.-d; Zopa, n.d.-b). 
 
2.4.2 Business 
Attributing a business loan to small- and medium-size enterprises emerged to be very 
difficult and limited via the traditional banking way. Through the market entrance of 
P2P, access to cheaper and flexible capital enables SME’s to finance their business 
projects. Therefore, companies can nowadays easily finance expansion, assets, liquidity 
or credits. Platforms providing SME loans are for example Swisspeers (CH), Lend (CH) 
and Prosper (US) (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 12; Cashare, n.d.; Rose, 2016). 
 
2.4.3 Real Estate 
For both of the above-mentioned segments as well as for real estate financing Cashare 
(CH) provides a suitable solution. It is supporting private individuals, SME or 
professional real estate companies when it comes to buying or rebuilding a property via 
mortgages, real estate loans or mezzanine financing. However, Cashare takes on the 
intermediation position between borrower and banks, where the mortgage application is 
verified by the platform itself before the client is transferred to a suitable bank. The 
minimum amount is hereby fixed to CHF 250’000.00. Nevertheless, the basic mortgage 
specifications are the ones set by the banking regulation (loan value maximum of 80% 
of the market value and financial encumbrance at most 40% of the gross income for an 
ordinary one-family house). The process for real estate loans or mezzanine financing, 
however, is fully accomplished by the platform (Cashare, n.d.b).  
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2.4.4 Public sector and large corporations 
Loanboox (CH), a capital intermediator for municipalities, cities, cantons and public 
corporations, entered a niche market in 2016. Where heavy financing like building a 
school, a public outdoor swimming pool or other public infrastructures are required, a 
municipality can request capital between CHF 500’000.00 and CHF 500 million via 
Loanboox. Approved institutional investors like banks, insurances or pension funds are 
then proposing their specific amount of capital. In return, the borrower can choose the 
most favorable one and agrees to transfer the compensation payments (Dietrich et al., 
2018, p. 10; Loanboox, n.d.). 
 
2.5 Lending platforms’ business model 
The chapter 2.5 facilitates a deeper comprehension of the communication and money 
flow when financing or investing in a P2P project. The lending process happens, unlike 
traditional bank loans, fully online. Therefore, all platforms are using cutting-edge 
technologies and innovations to interact and work with their clients. However, the 
model an online provider uses can vary for each platform (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 3). 
The illustration, figure 4, from Rainer Lenz (2018) gives the graphical basis to 
understand the mediation. 
 
 
Figure 4: Process of P2P lending (Lenz, 2018, p. 8)  
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In a simple P2P model, the borrower applies for a specific loan and must therefore, 
submit various mandatory information for evaluating the creditworthiness and the 
borrowing capacity. This happens through a standardized and cost-efficient credit 
application process (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 3). Besides the loan information such as 
amount, duration and purpose, it is necessary to provide details about the financial 
situation and credit standing, e.g. income, employment, debt situation, which may need 
to be documented for verification (Morse, 2015, p. 465). When the borrower is verified 
by the platform, the request is published to potential investors. If there is one or 
multiple investors, who are willing to finance the required amount requested by the 
borrower, the parties are brought together, and a loan agreement is established. This 
process takes place as a kind of an auction procedure. Depending on the platform’s 
services, it is also possible that the agreement is concluded between the platform and the 
parties. After paying the fees, the platform transfers the money from the investor’s 
account to the borrowers. In return, the lender receives a credit claim, which states the 
borrower’s commitment to pay periodical interest, amortizations and to repay the 
principal at maturity (Lenz, 2018). Any activity that happens after this process is 
handled by the P2P platform itself with no need to intervene by the investor. Precisely, 
the platform interacts as an agent and therefore is responsible for the payment flow like 
interest or fund as well as for delays or financial difficulties by the borrower (Claessens 
et al., 2018, p. 3; Dietrich et al., 2018, p. 7; Swisspeers AG, n.d.-a, p. 10). 
 
Marketplace lenders create a win-win situation for all the parties involved. Investors 
find attractive investment opportunities while companies or privates can finance growth 
via an additional financing source, which in some cases can be the only financing 
source available. Both together, however, establish an environment of growth and 
strengthen the economy (Swisspeers AG, n.d.-a, p. 6). 
 
2.5.1 Information provision  
This subchapter gives an exploration of the information provision in a P2P lending 
model. It is also a comparison of new and traditional credit risk assessment models. It 
further enables the reader to gain insight into challenging and sophisticated procedures. 
Nevertheless, the topic is discussed in a holistic view, since a detailed analysis would go 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Theoretical framework 
  12 
1. Pre-screening and signaling 
Vallee and Zeng (2018, p. 10) indicate that lending platforms collect information on 
debtors only through self-reporting and credit pulls. Yan, Yu, and Zhao (2015, p. 6) 
argue that P2P lending platforms retrieve information from a wide range of dynamic 
data, precisely, public websites, agencies and public records. This may include: 
 
Purchases using credit cards, accounting records, length of time the borrower 
has used the same email address, the number of connections on Twitter, 
Facebook or other social media sites, reviews and ratings from business 
directories such as Yelp, local and government public records. (Moldow, 2015, 
p. 20). 
 
This new source of data cannot only help to complete the big picture of a borrower but 
also changed the way in assessing credit risk from “passive information retrieval into 
proactive big data analytics” (Yan et al., 2015, p. 6). By passive information retrieval, 
one depends very much on the borrower’s willingness to disclose certain information 
while using the proactive way, the “online footprint” let the data speak about the 
borrower. The German platform Kreditech considers data behavior such as the approach 
the application is accomplished, usage of capital letters or the speed of the computer 
mouse. Zopa (US) tracks the rejected applicants in order to identify good credit risk. As 
a last one, Ali Finance (China) collects data about a borrower by accessing transaction 
details provided through its subsidiaries Alibaba.com, Tmall.com, Taobao.om and 
Alipay.com together with third-party information. For an accurate real-time analysis of 
the gathered data, machine learning algorithm and data weightings are used to assess the 
credit risk. This process follows up most of the P2P lending platforms, where the input 
is derived from all the available data (big data, application/identification information or 
FICO score) and through an algorithm model transformed in an output like credit 
scores. With that, interest rates can be determined and thus signals the level of loan 
quality to investors (Yan et al., 2015, pp. 5-7). 
 
Marketplace lending platforms, which act as an agent between lenders and borrowers 
are known for researching and signaling in a very time and cost-efficient way. 
Asymmetric information and its consequences, moral hazard (lack of information and 
control) and adverse selection (not able to distinguish between good and bad loans), are 
therefore diminished (Yan et al., 2015, pp. 3, 7; Akerlof, 1970). Yan et al. (2015) and 
Moldow (2015) are in line with their findings in concluding that big data enables a more 
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precise and reliable distinction of good and bad borrowers compared to the traditional 
credit evaluation. Yan et al. (2015, p. 7) argue that higher accuracy and reliability is due 
to the impossibility of manipulation and objectivity. However, increased volumes and 
variety of data only benefit if the quality and analysis is relatively high. Furthermore, 
Yang, Zhang and Jia (2017, p. 11) analyzed influencing factors of P2P lending success 
rates in China and found that soft information such as bidding records has an impact on 
success rates and therefore reduces information asymmetries and costs. Moreover, a US 
case where Weiss, Pelger and Horsch (2010, p. 1) conducted more than 5’000 credit 
transactions, proofed that the P2P lending platform Prosper limits adverse selection. 
Moldow (2015) additionally compared a FICO score model with new scoring models, 
which is visualized in figure 5. The FICO score model, created by Fair Isaac 
Corporation, is mainly used by traditional lenders for assessing credit risk. It considers 
five components: the payment history, credit utilization, types of credits, length of credit 
history and new credits accounts (myFICO, n.d.; Kaufman, 2016).  
 
Figure 5: Big data and FICO model comparison (Moldow, 2015, p. 22) 
The 45-degree line determines the standalone FICO model expected loan performance 
where risk and default rates are positively related. The bowed lines illustrate new 
scoring models including big data and FICO components. These lines show the models, 
which have positively identified borrowers, who are differently categorized by the 
FICO model. The space in between the straight and bowed line represents the potential 
of an improved model. It further shows that new models more accurately distinguish 
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between good and bad borrowers while the traditional model misses out on 
opportunities (Moldow, 2015, p. 22). 
 
2. Investor’s screening 
The platforms provide a standardized narrowed set of information about the borrowers 
to the investors. In turn, they are forced to screen and invest individually according to 
their risk appetite. Thus, the information a platform provides to those lenders has two 
main functions: quality check and screening. The first function allows the investors to 
judge the loan quality, which she/he is intended to invest while the latter one allows to 
further screen loans. Therefore, investor screening is an important role as it decides 
whether a loan gets funded or not and in turn impacts the platforms pre-screening and 
pricing. This form of information provision/quest is a remarkable difference to the 
traditional banking (Vallee & Zeng, 2018, pp. 8–9) 
 
2.5.2 P2P lending services 
The subchapter P2P lending services gives information about the service provision 
within different stages. Figure 6 illustrates an overview of those services a marketplace 
lender provides to its customers. The services are divided into three groups, namely, 
pre-agreement, on-going agreement and end of agreement, which is differentiated by the 
author. However, depending on the platform, not all services might be contributed 
internally but might be outsourced (Dietrich et al., 2018, p. 7). 
 
 
Figure 6: Additional platform services (Created by author) 
Looking at pre-agreement services, the chapter 2.5.1 already covered credit ratings and 
pricing, which no need to be further explained. A (partly) insurance for credit defaults is 
another service that can be agreed in advance. Therefore, the platform builds up a 
security back-up and in the event of a debtor default, the granted money is transferred to 
Pre-agreement
• Credit	ratings• Credit	pricing• Insurances• Credit	portfolio
On-going	agreement
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the investor (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 4). Moreover, a borrower has the chance to 
protect oneself against unemployment, death and inability to work with a partner 
insurance of the platform (Lend, n.d.-b). Further, investors can diversify their risk 
through investments in different loan projects, either invest in fractional loans, which is 
typically for retail investors or purchase various whole loans which is typically for 
institutional investors (Vallee & Zeng, 2018, p. 13). There is also the option to place the 
money in a credit portfolio, which is adjusted to the investor’s risk preference and 
conditions. According to the Cambridge Center for Alternative Finance, more than 95% 
American and 75% European P2P providers facilitate such a selection method (Ziegler 
et al., 2017; Ziegler et al., 2018). 
 
When everything is settled and the promised loan is transferred, the platform attends the 
loans by collecting charges. In addition, the platform is responsible for collecting and 
distributing amortizations and interest rates. Most Fintech platforms also provide 
monitoring and advisory services to its clients in a similar fashion as conducted by 
traditional banks. Investments and credits have matching maturities and normally it is 
not possible to liquidate those investments. However, within the term, there is 
occasionally the possibility to find another investor by oneself or if provided via the 
secondary market (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 3). 
 
At the end of the agreement, the platform transfers the principle including the interest 
rate back to the investor. In case of payment delays or default most Swiss P2P platforms 
have an in-house debt collection agency (45%) while 27% has outsourced or partly 
outsourced (27%) it (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 3; Dietrich et al., 2018, p. 19). However, 
this thesis does not further discuss the debt collection process. 
 
2.5.3 How the platform earns money 
It is quite difficult to determine the exact profits of different marketplace lenders, 
however, this chapter defines some income sources. The main originator of earnings is 
fees. When a project is successfully funded both borrowers and investors are paying 
small fees. Furthermore, additional services are also generating fees. The next 
paragraphs compare the fee structure of a Swiss and an American P2P lending provider.  
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The Swiss platform Lend does not charge any fees on the application process. However, 
after a successful publication, the borrower pays a score-based fee of 0.2-1% of the 
whole loan amount, which is calculated for the whole maturity. It is a one-time fee at 
the beginning of the contract. Other services than registration, account management and 
publishing a project, are in charge of a fee, which is directly deducted from the loan 
payout. On the contrary, investors just pay an annual fee of 1% of their total amount 
invested, which is subtracted from the monthly investment income (Lend, n.d.-b). 
 
Having invested in a loan at Prosper an investor pays an annual 1% service fee. The 
borrower, however, a closing fee is directly applied and is based on its rating. For 
example, an AA one year loan is charged by 0.5% while a B rated one year loan is 
charged 2.95% of the loan amount (Prosper, n.d.-b; Prosper, n.d.-a). 
 
2.6 Regulatory framework 
Chapter 2.6 delivers insight into the regulatory framework of the P2P lending industry. 
It shows the importance of the regulator in such a young living business. The chapter 
gives a short overview of different regulations in Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
India, as demonstrated in figure 7. An example of Chinas’ specifications is made in the 
subchapter 2.8.3 platform uncertainties and risks. 
 
Figure 7: Country-specific regulatory comparison (Created by the author)  
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In 2017, the Swiss Federal Council released new regulations for Fintech companies, 
which simplifies the market entry and strengthen the competitive position of the Swiss 
financial center. Consequential, loans for companies up to CHF 1 million can now be 
funded by more than 20 public funds without any permission as well as an extension of 
the settlement time limit of 60 days instead of seven. This applies also to other financial 
institutions, which are based on the Banking Ordinance. One year later, however, the 
rule has been further extended for the segment private consumption. This was possible 
due to the fact that crowdlending is subject to the Consumer Credit Act (CCA) as of 
April 2019. CCA aims to prevent debtors from excessive indebtedness through 
consumer loans. Key elements are: mandatory credit standing check, the obligation of 
the finance provider to notify granted consumer credit, observance of legal rate, right of 
withdrawal and the prohibition of pushing promotion (Swiss Federal Council, 2017; 
Swiss Federal Council, 2018; Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung, 2016, p. 2). Despite 
that, investments on a P2P platform are not under deposit protection (withdrawal of 
privileged deposits of maximum CHF 100’000.00 per client in case of bankruptcy) as it 
is the case for banks and securities broker (FINMA, n.d.). Nonetheless, the Swiss 
Federal Council provides a good ground for innovation and development with more 
freedom and thus fosters competition. 
 
The United Kingdom has a single regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 
which is currently in favor of marketplace lending. Since April 2014 firms, which plan 
to participate in the crowdlending market first need to apply for permission at FCA. In 
order to obtain the license, platforms are forced to maintain minimum operating capital 
standards, monitor clients’ money, and meet disclosure requirements. In addition, they 
are required to have a contingency plan, which secures the loan repayments to investors 
in the event of the platform’s breakdown (Srethapramote et al., 2015, p. 40; Financial 
Conduct Authority, 2015, p. 2). Despite these existing requirements, the FCA constantly 
tries to improve and develop the marketplace environment. Based on the consultation 
paper the FCA (2018) aims at several improvements for investors, borrowers and 
platforms. Firstly, to integrate a better information provision for investors concerning 
the platform’s services and charges as well as detailed information about the investment 
risk with an accurate interest rate for the risk taken. Secondly, home financed borrowers 
should get protection similar as provided by authorized providers. Thirdly, platforms 
should be well-governed, including an appropriate business structure that goes along 
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with customer fairness, clear and accurate pricing and risk assessment. Additionally, a 
resolution plan in case the platform stops operating is required. 
 
India entered the P2P lending market without any regulations and was affected by 
mistrust and doubtfulness on both sides, borrowers and investors. However, the demand 
of rejected borrowers by banks, and investors seeking profitable investments was high. 
India’s P2P lending boom, however, occurred a few years ago in 2017 where the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) classified marketplace lender as Non-Banking Financial 
Companies. With that registration, an operation framework was introduced. The RBI 
transformed the online lending market to a more trustworthy and more secure business 
for the stakeholders. In order to apply for the certificate of registration, a platform needs 
to have at least net funds of INR 20 million (approximately CHF 0.29 million at time of 
writing). The introduction of a minimum fund prevents the market from unserious 
companies. When registered, a clear set of operations is defined where the platform 
needs to focus on the core activity, the intermediation, and no form of diversification 
(accept deposits or provide credits) is allowed. Furthermore, RBI defined some 
maximum standards: an investor can lend a maximum of INR 1 million (approximately 
CHF 14’000.00 at the time of writing) to borrowers and a borrower can get a maximum 
loan of INR 1 million. In addition, an investor can lend no more than INR 50’000.00 to 
the same borrower. These limits apply across all Indian P2P lending providers and 
ensure that investors, as well as borrowers, do not take too much risk. Besides that, 
platforms are obligated to navigate the money flow through escrow accounts operated 
by a trustee. Additionally, to guarantee purposeful disposition, no cash transactions are 
allowed. Another requirement is the submission of monthly updated credit data of 
borrowers to credit information companies. It assures that delays and defaults are 
reported, while borrowers are more careful due to a possible refusal for future loans. In 
order to ensure that investors can make an informed investment decision, marketplace 
lenders need to disclose a monthly portfolio performance including a proportion of non-
performing assets. Further, the platform is required to publish a fair practice code to 
ensure that stakeholders understand the risk involved, no guarantee of return and the 
probability of a total loss. Moreover, the provider ensures that recoveries of loans are 
adequately and professionally handled and displays that the RBI is not in charge of any 
responsibility. As a last, the platform shall put in place a tool for complaints as well as 
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data security and a business continuity plan (Singh, 2019; Reserve Bank of India, 2017, 
p. 1-8; Finanzen.ch, n.d.). 
 
2.7 Opportunities 
Chapter 2.7 is one of the two main literature chapters where opportunities for all the 
three parties, investor (2.7.1), borrower (2.7.2) and platform (2.7.3), are researched and 
explained. It is important because chapter 4 practical framework, further analyzes these 
remarks. An overview of the different benefits is shown in figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Overview opportunities (Created by the author) 
2.7.1 Investor 
The return of a P2P investment has to compensate for the additional risk taken and 
needs to be higher than other investments with the same risk. This statement must be 
true when taking recent growth rates of the overall crowdlending into considerations. In 
other words, investors put money in P2P investments due to the fact of receiving higher 
returns than common investments, which is because of the higher risk of a P2P loan. 
Funding Circle, the leading P2P lending platform in the United Kingdom, projects 
annualized returns after fees and bad debt of 4.5%-5.5% in 2018 and 5%-7% for the 
first quarter of 2019 (Funding Circle, 2019-a). Nevertheless, such returns are dependent 
on the platform, quality and maturity of the loan as well as on diversification of the risk 
(Lenz, 2018, pp. 10–11). Investing CHF 100’000.00 in an A+ (best possible rating) loan 
for one year, the Swiss P2P lender Lend (n.d.-c) offers an average net return of 2.29%. 
Investing the same amount in a C rated loan would result in an average net return of 
4.67%. The expected cumulative loss rate for an A+ is stated to be between 0.19% and 
1.11% whereas the C rated loan bears an expected cumulative loss of 0.94%-7.75%. 
Comparing it to the returns of saving accounts or the Swiss bond market, P2P returns 
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Another opportunity is observed in the convenience a marketplace lending brings with 
it. Investors can access the platform very comfortable 24 hours / 7 days (24/7) through 
every internet capable device. In addition, the processing happens in a very time 
efficient way and on a low-cost basis. To overcome cluster risk investors do not 
necessarily need to diversify their investment by themselves but can make use of the 
platform’s solution of an automated order placement where the maximum amount of 
money, maturity and risk appetite is defined (Lenz, 2018, p. 11; Perkins, 2018, p. 8). In 
addition, the investor does not need to supervise cashflows as it is one of the platform’s 
responsibility. Further, in the event of a default the investor can make use of the 
platforms own or external provided debt collection service, however, this service is 
associated with additional costs. 
 
2.7.2 Borrower 
Analogous to the lender, the borrowers profit from the convenient P2P platform service 
in the same manner. Additionally, according to Fuster, Plosser, Schnabl and Vickery 
(2018) the credit applications are processed on average 15%-30% faster than other 
credit grantors’ processing. In case of a sudden liquidity shortage, this time savings can 
be essential. 
 
Moreover, especially for SME’s or less wealthy individuals, access to a less costly P2P 
financing source is attractive. Big banks might not finance these segments due to 
unprofitable credits (low credit amount) or low credit standings. Therefore, a credit via 
a marketplace lender is sometimes the only source to finance a project for a borrower 
(Claessens et al., 2018, p. 12). 
 
Borrowers benefit from low transaction costs when applying for a web-based loan. 
Lower transaction costs result from the underlying technology, which fosters a fast and 
easily accessible application process, less paperwork and documentation, and 
transparency. Less bureaucracy not only means based on the application process but 
also that no collateral is needed when providing funding for a borrower (Lenz, 2018, p. 
15). Such low-cost technologies and the fee-based structure makes obviously an impact 
on low interest rates. 
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In reference to Lenz (2018), flexibility is another important factor for borrowers. While 
the provision of additional financing is one flexibility component, borrowers profit from 
the opportunity to disperse an ongoing contract. Accordingly, amortizations can be 
made in case of a contractual agreement. Most marketplace lenders additionally allow 
borrowers full flexibility through reducing the financing in case of additional capital is 
saved or gained over time. Thus, borrowers profit from paying lower interest payments 
due to a smaller loan amount. 
 
2.7.3 Platform 
The main advantage of marketplace lenders compared to traditional lenders is seen in 
their cost structure. The operating costs can be held relatively low due to online-only 
services like application process, automated credit assessment and negligence of 
subsidiaries (Perkins, 2018, p. 7). A Deloitte analysis of Tomlinson, Foottit and Doyle 
(2016, pp. 13;21) shows that loan acquisition costs of a platform lender are almost 
double the expenses of a bank whereas the loan processing and servicing costs are more 
than 60% lower. Although marketplace lenders have currently an operating cost 
advantage, banks profit from an advantage in structural costs (economies of scales) and 
lower sensitivity to interest rate changes. It is expected that if the credit environment 
recovers and interest rates start to rise again, online lenders expenses start to increase as 
well. Perkins (2018, pp. 7-8), however, argues that the technology-driven costs of a 
marketplace does not significantly increase as the loan volume do and therefore the 
operating-cost advantage can be extended within a growing industry. 
 
In chapter 2.5.1 Information provision the credit scoring model of a marketplace lender 
is explained. The analyzed literature agreed on the consensus that the big data approach 
identifies and calculates risk better than traditional models. This seems to be a major 
advantage of P2P finance. However, according to the Deloitte analysis (2016) there is 
limited belief that online lenders “systematically price the risk better in areas where 
banks have an appetite to play” (p. 20). Although this approach first needs to prove 
itself in a whole credit cycle, the innovative approach evolves a new risk-scoring 
algorithm to reduce default rates. In case of a positive effect it is not necessary a 
comparative advantage anymore but rather a new form of assessment to which 
traditional lenders could start to adapt to (Tomlinson et al., 2016, pp. 20–21). 
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Another opportunity is observed in the convenience a marketplace lending brings with 
it. Precisely, the model delivers investors and borrowers a better experience due to 
lower time costs and more comfort. Using the internet application 24/7 from every 
internet capable device and the fast processing speed are main advantages. Unlike 
traditional banks, which have to restructure and adjust their infrastructure and systems, 
online platforms may meet the clients need in a more efficient way (Perkins, 2018, p. 8; 
Ghose et al., 2016, p. 8). 
 
The business model’s risk decentralization mechanism is a big risk reduction 
opportunity. Due to the fact that platforms act as off-balance-sheet operators, the credit 
risk is fully transferred to the investor. Nevertheless, there are some marketplace 
lenders, which are holding the credit positions in their books and therefore bear the risk 
but also might profit from a better investment opportunity (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 3). 
 
2.8 Uncertainties and risk 
The chapter 2.8 uncertainties and risks, gives an overview of possible risks for all 
parties involved. It provides valuable clues from past research, which then can be 
compared with the results gained in the practical framework (chapter 4). An overview is 
given in figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Overview uncertainties / risks (Created by author) 
Jiazhuo G. Wang and Hongwei Xu Jun Ma (2015) identified nine risk types in online 
lending: “insufficient credit checking, inadequate intermediation, untimely repayment, 
lack of liquidity, lack of transparency, operational and technical failure, legal risk, 
excessive leverage, and lack of ethics” (Yan et al., 2015, p. 3). Moenninghoff and 
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come along with the new form of financing (Yan et al., 2015, p. 3). The different risks 
are allocated to the affected party and explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.8.1 Investor 
The biggest risk is seen in the credit risk, which is the potential loss due to the 
borrower’s default or a change in credit standing (Schweizer, 2018, p. 10). The Annual 
Global Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions from Standard and Poors (S&P) 
global ratings shows that default rates are in strong correlation with economic 
movements. In other words, default rates significantly increase in times of recession 
with a stronger peculiarity for high-risk categories (Vazza et al., 2017, pp. 3–4). In 
addition, those high-risk categories also bear a rather high standard deviation of default 
rates compared to low-risk categories. Nevertheless, a big factor for credit risk lies in 
the choice of loan maturity. The longer the investor provides capital to the borrower the 
higher is the credit risk and the chance interest rates might change. It means an investor 
might miss out opportunities for a better investment in the event of a deterioration of the 
borrower’s credit standing or an interest rate rise. The effect of repricing/re-evaluation 
of an investment or borrower due to market movements or change in the borrower’s 
credit assessment like it is done in the bond market, is faded in a marketplace lending 
word. Only if there is a secondary market where the loan changes financer there might 
be a repricing (Lenz, 2018, pp. 11–12). Nevertheless, some platforms offer fee-based 
investor protection in the form of an insurance to cover costs caused by credit risk, 
which is explained in 2.5.2 P2P lending services. 
Serrano-Cinca, Gutiérrez-Nieto and López-Palacios (2015, p. 18) analyzed the 
determinants of default rates of the marketplace lender Lending Club. The results 
showed that first of all the assigned borrower rating has obviously a strong correlation 
to the default rate. Thus, A-graded loans were repaid by 94.4% whereas a G-graded loan 
has a ratio of 61.8%. In comparison, the Swiss marketplace Lend (2016) projects default 
rates of 0.29%-0.54% for an A-graded loan and 0.94%-1.72% for a D-graded loan 
(lowest rating where offers are published). The allotted interest rate reflects these 
default probabilities and thus demonstrates a strong positive relationship. Secondly, the 
paper identified the loan purpose as another default determinant where a loan for a 
wedding is less risky compared to a loan to a small business. In fact, loans to small 
business were identified as the riskiest loan purpose. Other important factors are 
observed for the borrower’s characteristics such as salary, housing situation, credit 
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history and level of debt. On the contrary, loan amount or the duration of employment 
were found to be less relevant variables. From this study, one can conclude that all 
comes down to the provision of an accurate and clear credit assessment in order to 
signal default rates properly. 
 
Providing a deeper insight into P2P lending default rates figure 10 shows the historical 
default performance of Zopa UK. Zopa was founded in 2005 and is known as the first 
P2P lending company which provides simple electronic access to loans and 
investments. In light of its pioneer position, Zopa is a good example to compare its 
performance. 
 
Figure 10: Zopa historical default performance (Zopa, n.d.-a) 
The dark blue trend line visualizes the default expectations at loan origination whereas 
the light blue line represents the updated loan performance. In addition, the yellow 
pillars until 2013 show actual loan defaults as a percentage of the total amount lent in 
each calendar year. The actual default rates from 2014 onwards are still outstanding and 
indicate the current state (Zopa, n.d.-a). In 2008 there was a first peak of about 4% loan 
defaults which were probably caused by the financial crisis. A second peak becomes 
apparent in 2016, which may have been created by the introduction of developing and 
emerging markets. 
 
In comparison, figure 11 reveals the UK’s non-performing loans to total gross loans 
data, which is retrieved from CEICData and yearly reported by the World Bank. 
Significant is that the highest percentage of non-performing loans occurred in 2010 and 
2011 whereas Zopa experiences a one time high in 2008. Further, non-performing bank 
loans recovered less fast from the crisis but remained falling until 2017.  
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Figure 11: United Kingdom's non-performing loans (CEIC & World Bank, n.d.) 
Nevertheless, this comparison targeted a visualization but may not be very 
representative since Zopa only provides consumer loans and banks a wide variety of 
loans. This paper does not go further into details about this topic. 
 
Investment risk, respectively liquidity and cluster risk, are other potential sources of 
losses for investors. Capital on a bank account, invested in stocks, metals or other liquid 
assets can be easily withdrawn on a daily basis or within a couple of months. In 
contrast, the amount of money lent to the P2P borrower is mostly unsecured and fixed 
to maturity. Therefore, an investor needs to free up capital for several months or years, 
in some cases without any exit option. The liquidity risk, however, is reduced if loans 
can be traded in a secondary market (Lenz, 2018; Moenninghoff & Wieandt, 2013, p. 
479). 
In order to profit from high returns, investors need to consider various aspects like 
quality and maturity of the loan as well as diversification of the investment. Due to the 
lack of the middleman as a risk buffer, respectively diversifier, the investor is 
automatically affected by cluster risk. In other words, there is a high risk involved when 
investing in only one loan, which might default. In order to reduce individual risk and to 
profit from diversification effects, small investments in various different loans become 
crucial. In the case of backing the wrong horse, through diversification the bad debt can 
be absorbed by other good loans (Lenz, 2018, pp. 10–11; Funding Circle, 2019-a). 
 
Lenz (2018) sees a problem with the platform’s disclosure standards according to the 
risk lenders might be involved. In fact, there is no disclosure policy by right, which 
forces platforms to identify investor’s risk understanding. A lender might therefore 
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underestimate the risks when using a P2P platform. Nevertheless, under the EU 
consumer protection law, the investor gets signaled for a potential total loss of the 
investment but is not forced to analyze the risk-return profile and thus does not decide 
rationally on the investment. Further, it is very difficult to compare the various 
platforms according to their figures and statistics published. In this regard, no common 
approach is defined by law for measuring performance indicators such as the risk-
adjusted net return (composed of gross interest rates, bad debt rates, default rates, etc.) 
as well as the method used when assessing the borrowers’ credit rating. Because of 
these comparability difficulties, it makes it very problematic for investors to choose the 
right marketplace and not be misled. 
 
Another aspect a lender might worry about is the platform’s shut down or insolvency. 
Lenz (2018, p. 12) is judging the European platforms with a high probability for 
insolvencies due to accumulating losses year by year as well as the fact that some 
platforms are still not reaching positive numbers. In addition, P2P investors are not 
included in the EU Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, which guarantees EUR 
100’000.00 deposits on a bank account per person. Therefore, the investors should give 
a great deal of attention to this risk category as well. Nevertheless, in the UK, the FCA 
requires marketplace lenders to have a resolution plan that in case of platform 
insolvency, the loan repayment is guaranteed. However, these requirements are a rarity 
for operating crowdlending platforms (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015; Lenz, 2018, 
p. 16). 
The business model’s fee-based approach enhances the origination of bad loans. In 
practice, the platform does not bear the risk of default and therefore may accept more 
bad borrowers in order to collect the fees. This fraud can also incentivize traditional 
lending models, like banks, however, they are subject to risk-retention rules and 
regulations to mitigate this risk (Perkins, 2018, p. 11). 
 
One common risk for lenders and borrowers is market risk. This sort of risk defines a 
potential loss due to unexpected changes in market prices, e.g. fluctuations in interest 
rates, currencies, equity or commodity prices (Posth, n.d., pp. 25-27). Investors and 
borrowers might miss out opportunities in the event of an interest rate change. For 
example, an investor does not profit from the rising interest rates due to the investment 
in a long-term P2P loan with no exit opportunity. On the contrary, a borrower might pay 
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considerably higher interest rates when there is a market turn with lower interest rates 
(Lenz, 2018, p. 15). There is a similar process in the event of inflation or deflation, 
however, in such a case money is worth less or more. 
 
2.8.2 Borrower 
Considering the borrowers perspective there are three major risk types they could face: 
market risk, rejection and transparency. Market risk is already covered in the previous 
paragraph and therefore neglected in this chapter. The two platform risks are explained 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
Applying for a loan via a marketplace platform and be dependent on the investor’s 
decision whether to fund a project or not marks a big uncertainty. There is no guarantee 
that the specific amount of loan requested at a defined interest rate, maturity and 
involved risk will be fully funded. Nevertheless, most rejected offers are revised and 
republished with a higher interest rate until it meets investors’ expectations (Lenz, 2018, 
p. 16). 
 
Another uncertainty is seen in transparency when borrowers’ credit standing is assessed. 
Neither the lenders nor the borrowers have detailed information about the data or the 
approach used, to calculate the credit rating. This lack of disclosure increases the 
speculation potential about whether discrimination aspects like age, residence or 
migration background play a role in the credit rating determination (Lenz, 2018, p. 16). 
To conclude this paragraph, for borrowers it is almost impossible to retrace the reasons 
for being either completely rejected by the platform or the calculated credit rating, 
which is linked with the specific interest rate payable. 
 
2.8.3 Platform 
According to Dietrich et al.'s (2018) P2P lending survey in Switzerland, major risk 
factors are identified as follows: reputation risk, loan default rates of other platforms 
and internal, operational risks, macroeconomic development and interest rates. This list 
is complemented with Perkins (2018) fraud risk and cybercrime listed by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (2016). 
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Starting with reputation risk, platforms fear the misbehavior of other market participants 
and thus negative press for the whole crowdlending market, which could cause 
reputational damage. Misbehavior could refer to violations of regulations, fraud or 
improper credit assessment which is associated with higher default rates. Internal loan 
default rates and the ones from other platforms could not only cause industry-wide 
reputational damage but also may let a platform run into bankruptcy (Dietrich et al., 
2018, pp. 16–19). Reputational damage is therefore fully based on the lack of trust and 
once it is lost, it is difficult to regain it. An example for investors’ mistrust is the US 
platform Lending Club. The P2P provider was externally affected by low returns, 
suspect business practices of others as well as platform shutdowns. However, the 
platform itself hints at discrepancies as well. Ultimately, Lending Club had to buy back 
credits due to insufficient loan requirements and conflicting interests of the management 
were revealed. These external and internal circumstances led to a drop in investor’s trust 
and demand (Claessens et al., 2018, p. 12). 
 
Operational risk defines the potential loss caused by “inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events” (Posth, n.d.-a, p. 20). This 
definition also includes legal risks. The utilized computer systems, the applied control 
procedures or employees are all decisions taken by the company and therefore internal 
risks. External risks are those over which the company has no control such as natural 
disasters, political and regulatory issues (Hull, 2015, p. 481). China, for example, which 
takes on a leading position in P2P lending, started to clean up the sector with identifying 
over 150 problematic aspects such as high interest rates, misuse of funds or exaggerated 
return figures. By introducing regulations, numerous P2P lending platforms need to be 
shut down due to insufficient knowledge in that business. In this aspect, in July 2018 
there were 118 failed platforms, which makes up the most since 2016 (Bloomberg, 
2018). According to estimates, there were no new entrants since August 2018 but rather 
a drop of more than 50% to 1’021 providers in 2018. Moreover, it is predicted that there 
is a further drop by 70% to a remaining number of 300 companies by the end of the year 
2019 (Bloomberg, 2019). 
Cybercrime is another operational risk, which refers to inadequate processes or systems. 
Nevertheless, this is a concern which not only affects P2P platforms but is rather all 
types of firms. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (2016) therefore suggests accurate 
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protections, best practices and recovery plans in order to reduce cybercrime and to 
protect customers (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016, p. 36). 
 
Considering the market development the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2016, p. 1) 
refers to a concentration of underwriting risk due to the favorable market condition in 
which the P2P lending industry has grown. Since the majority of P2P platforms have 
been introduced there was not any economic downturn where the development of 
default rates and delinquency could be tested. Furthermore, platforms’ main target is to 
attract both parties, capital supplier and capital demander. In times of a low interest 
environment and economic expansion, there are enough investors seeking profitable 
investment opportunities and additionally, the credit demand is high. On the contrary, 
when the market turns and falls into recession, marketplace lending may not remain the 
same (Perkins, 2018, p. 10). The literature of the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(2016), Perkins (2018) and the report of Standard and Poors (2017), which observed a 





The third chapter, methodology, covers all the applied methods for the theoretical and 
practical part. Firstly, the paper selection process for the literature review is explained. 
Thereafter, the different approaches used for the stakeholder analysis and evaluation of 
opportunities and risks in the practical framework, are defined. 
 
For the theoretical framework, a keyword-search was conducted when looking for 
appropriate research papers. In this respect, databases like Google Scholar, Science 
direct, Academia, Research gate and Nebis were scanned. Keywords such as “P2P 
lending”, “peer-to-peer lending”, “marketplace lending” and “crowdlending” were used 
and further journals were found through a back- and forward search. 37 representative 
journals and reports were found from the year 2009 until 2019. Additionally, eight 
major P2P lending platforms were covered within this thesis (Bachmann et al., 2011, p. 
4). The majority of the platforms are Swiss, however, perspectives of other leading 
countries like the UK and the US were added. Further, the thesis also covered some 
notes about P2P lending in China and India. An overview can be seen in table 1. 
 
Year Amount Reference 
Before 5 Bachmann et al., 2011; Greiner & Wang, 2009; Lin, 2009; Weiss, 
Pelger & Horsch, 2010; Moenninghoff & Wieandt, 2013 
2015 6 Morse, 2015; Prime Meridian Capital Management, 2015; Serrano-
Cinca, Gutierrez-Nieto & Lopez-Palacios, 2015; Srethapramote et al., 
2015; Wang & Jun Ma, 2015; Yan, Yu & Zhao, 2015 
2016 6 Ghose et al., 2016; Rose, 2016; Tomplinson, Foottit & Doyle, 2016; 
Yu, Zheng, Xu & Wang, 2016; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2016; Lend, 2016 
2017 4 Reserve Bank of India, 2017; Van Liebergen, 2017; Yang, Zhang, Jia, 
2017; Ziegler et al, 2017 
2018 9 Adriana & Dhewantoa, 2018; Bloomber, 2018; Claessens et al., 2018; 
Dietrich et al., 2018; Financial Conduct Authority, 2018; Lenz, 2018; 
Perkins, 2018; Valle & Zeng, 2018; Ziegler et al., 2018 
2019 7 Bloomberg, 2019; Singh, 2019; Funding circle, 2019; Loanboox, 
2019; Funding Circle, 2019 (a-b); Cashare, 2019 
Platforms 8 Cashare, Funding Circle, Lend, Lending Club, Loanboox, Prosper, 
Swisspeers, Zopa 
Table 1: Covered research papers in dependence on (Bachmann et al., 2011, p. 4)  
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Because the topic is rather new and not much proven literature or statistics are available, 
not all papers used are peer-reviewed. However, the journals were reviewed with an 
objective and neutral perspective without any behavioral bias or a certain position. 
Representative journals that point into a specific research direction or differ from other 
findings were included in the theoretical framework. Further, the focus was set on 
general information about the P2P lending business as well as specific benefits and 
threats for the main players. Thereby, the literature was chosen according to those target 
topics. In addition, only off-balance sheet platforms were considered due to the belief 
that agents that are holding credit positions in their books act differently in the market. 
The literature was managed by the research assistant Zotero software, which organized 
and cited the literature based on the American Psychology Association (APA) style 
rules. 
 
On the basis of the literature, external stakeholders were further qualitatively appraised 
in the chapter 4. Since the P2P market is rather new, there is only limited literature 
where online lending stakeholders were identified and prioritized. Interviewing all 
involved stakeholders was found to be inadequate due to a lack of required time and 
resources. Alternatively, the typology of Varvasovszky and Brugha (2000) was found to 
be suited for the analysis. Additionally, Adriana and Dhewantoa (2018) analyzed 
stakeholders of Indonesian marketplace lenders based on the same approach, which was 
taken as reference. Supported by the characteristics elaborated from the literature each 
stakeholder was assessed according to four dimensions: interest in the issue, 
influence/power, position and impact. Applying those two techniques an exact 
stakeholder analysis emerged whereby conflicts of interests and influential parties were 
identified. The subsequent stakeholder prioritization model adapted from Knecht (2018, 
p. 15) visualized high impact groups and facilitated to focusing on main target groups. 
 
After filtering important stakeholders, opportunities and risks for investors, borrowers 
and platforms, were evaluated. Firstly, the analysis of the opportunities follows a 
customer value approach. Specifically, it consists of the statements and conclusions of 
Meffert, Burmann, and Kirchgeorg (2012, p. 387). Additionally, the valuation design in 
the form of a hexagon, respectively, pentagon, and the analogies are subject to 
Designpilot (n.d.). Nevertheless, the analysis is only partially based on those two 
references and was mostly further developed by the author. It is an approximation of 
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customer prioritization and banks’ services, which has not been investigated before. 
Nevertheless, the individuality and different preferences of investors borrowers and 
banks resulted in the decision to define common attributes for these parties. Therefore, 
this thesis assumes an investor who is mainly seeking high yield investment opportunity 
with a basic understanding of finance. In contrast, a borrower is looking for a cheap and 
convenient financing option with no need for further services or products. Lastly, a bank 
is characterized by the attributes of a universal bank with a strong focus on credit 
transactions. While the literature discussed the P2P opportunities in detail, the thesis 
focused on prioritization of customers. Therefore, the opportunities for an investor and a 
borrower were prioritized according to their preferences, which is described above. It 
represents the need for such features. Additionally, a bank’s characteristics were 
visualized as well in order to show the competitive advantages of a P2P provider. 
Therefore, the marketplace lender represents the optimum in the hexagon/pentagon due 
to the fact that all benefits are key advantages based on the state-of-the-art P2P model. 
Since the analysis is limited to qualitative literature, there is a certain scope for 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the applied analysis provides a sound foundation in order 
to understand the importance of P2P lending opportunities. 
 
Evaluating the risks for each party turned out to be a complex procedure. However, it 
seemed reasonable to argue that the risk analysis was more decisive than the benefit 
analysis. The author assumed that in general, the customers could be blinded by the 
attractive benefits. Consequently, the potential risk during a potential future recession or 
economic downturn is disregarded. The risk awareness of this newly introduced 
business model was therefore rather low. Similar to the identified opportunities there is 
not much research about an evaluation of P2P lending risks. Consequently, the author 
was confronted with the challenge to find an appropriate approach which suits such an 
evaluation. Due to the fact that marketplace lending provides web-based services and 
works with cutting-edge technology, it made the research more complex. Despite the 
fact that no quantitative data was available, applying the severity and frequency method 
was found to be most suited. The approach was introduced to the author during a risk 
management lecture at Zurich University of Applied Science when the operational risks 
of a bank were evaluated. The modified and adapted approach was felt to accurately 
assess the value and the risks in a P2P business. The terms and partly the description of 
the various severity and frequency classes were retrieved from the lecture materials, 
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which were compiled by Posth (n.d.-c, pp. 26-28). Further, the design and classification 
of the severity and frequency matrix was used from the same reference. However, the 
description of the different severity classes and adaption for a P2P lending business was 
derived from the elaborated literature of this thesis. Further, the required input data was 
originated from the literature review and was justified by its findings. However, where 
necessary, additional sources for justification reasons were added. As a result, this 
qualitative analysis featured a profound understanding of the risks in the P2P lending 
market. 
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4. Practical framework 
Chapter 4, practical framework, builds on the findings of chapter 2. theoretical 
framework. First of all, the identified stakeholders in 2.2 Stakeholder map, are further 
analyzed and prioritized in 4.1 stakeholder analysis. With that the most influential 
parties, investors (4.2.1) and borrowers (4.2.2), are evaluated according to their 
opportunities and risks. Further in chapter 4.2 assessment of key stakeholders, an 
additional examination of the platform (4.2.3) is conducted. 
 
4.1 Stakeholder analysis 
Based on the identified external stakeholders in the literature review, this chapter 
evaluates the parties according to their interest, power, respectively influence, position 
and impact. Later on, figure 12 illustrates the stakeholder’s prioritization in order to 
bring influential and most important parties to light. The first evaluation can be seen in 




Interest Influence Position Impact 
Investors high medium supportive medium 
Borrowers medium low supportive high 
Competitor high medium supportive high 
Partners medium low supportive high 
Regulator high high supportive high 
Table 2: Stakeholder analysis in dependence on (Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000, p. 342) 
The dimension, interest, represents the degree of importance of the objectives for the 
particular stakeholder in case of a platform change. Dimension two, influence, implies 
the level of power a stakeholder has towards the transformation of the market, e.g. new 
requirements. Thirdly, the position can be supportive, non-mobilized or opposed, which 
indicates how a stakeholder takes on a stand on a certain issue. Lastly, the impact is 
translated as the degree of how a stakeholder gets affected in the event of a policy 
change (Adriana & Dhewantoa, 2018). According to those dimensions, five stakeholder 
groups are assessed and explained in the following paragraph. An evaluation for the 
owner respectively platform itself is found to be less representative since the 
stakeholders are tested based on the dimensions, which refer to the platform.  
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Investors investing their own money are the main targeted market of a platform’s 
services which results in a high interest level. Additionally, it is believed that they are in 
support of the alignment of regulatory regimes and their objectives, e.g. investors 
protection, adequate interest rates or credit signaling. However, their influence on the 
continuation of changes in the market or requirements is limited. Though investors are 
very sensitive concerning trust and when it is used wrongly the continuation of the 
business can be affected. The position is judged to be supportive due to the fact that 
investors are seeking profitable investment opportunities, especially in the current low-
interest environment. Investors get affected by policy changes but can then seek out for 
other investments. Borrower’s interest in aligning their goals with new regulations is 
seen to be of medium importance since they want to get funded without a lot of 
restrictions. Their impact on the proceedings in the P2P market is valued to be less 
influential. Nevertheless, borrower’s take on a supportive stance and get highly affected 
in the event of legal changes. Competitors have a rather high interest to align regulatory 
regimes and their goals. In support of this, the market behavior, e.g. misbehavior, of 
each marketplace lender has a huge impact on other players. Competitors play a 
supportive role and get strongly impacted by policymakers. Partners, however, have a 
medium interest in the alignment due to the possibility to replace the partner or to do 
such processes in-house. However, sometimes it is not that easy and reputational effects 
or market pressure need to be considered. The power for the market transformation is 
deemed to be less relevant. Partners are estimated to be in support of the platforms’ 
services due to strategic benefits. Additionally, it is believed that the partnerships get 
affected in case of a regulatory change. Reasons for that may be increased paperwork or 
tighter monitoring or financing requirements. Last but not least, the regulator takes on a 
high interest in the alignment of objectives and policy regimes. On the one hand, it 
wants to have an open market and competition to target economic growth but on the 
other hand, there need to be certain regulations to guarantee fair market development. 
The influence and impact are correspondingly high. The regulator has to put in place 
minimum policies to provide a good ground for doing business and therefore take on a 
supportive position.  
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The identified stakeholders are further prioritized in order to identify conflicts of 
interests and to elaborate strategies. However, for this thesis it is of great interest to 
assure that the main stakeholders are identified. Figure 12 visualizes classified parties 
according to their importance for a marketplace lender. Thereby, the platform’s impact 
on the party and the party’s impact on the platform are considered. 
 
Figure 12: Prioritization of stakeholder in dependence on (Knecht, 2018, p. 15) 
Hence, the cluster owner, customers (investors and borrowers) and partners such as 
banks or other Fintech companies are identified to be the main target groups. 
Additionally, competitors and the regulator are identified to be a supporting group. 
Other stakeholders are considered to be of less importance. 
 
These findings do not only help to elaborate strategies but also provides the foundation 
for further analysis in chapter 4.2 evaluation of key stakeholders. Therefore, the owner 
is representing the whole platform whereas customers consist of investors and 
borrowers. These key groups are carefully examined according to their opportunities 
and risks in a P2P lending market which has been elaborated in chapter 2 theoretical 
framework. An in-depth analysis of partners is neglected due to its individuality. The 
supportive group, competitors and regulator, reflects the wider P2P market and 
supplements the main target group in its elaboration. 
 
4.2 Assessment of key stakeholders 
The target of chapter 4.2 is to elaborate marketplace lenders’ opportunities and concerns 
on which they need to take a closer look at. Therefore, the arising question is whether 
Stakeholder’s impact on platform 
Platform
’s im










the risks outweigh the rewards in the P2P lending market. Further, the assessment of the 
key stakeholders provides a broader view on various issues and a deeper understanding 
of the platforms’ challenges and chances. The three key market participants, investor, 
borrower and platform, are evaluated according to the literature-based components 
opportunities and risks. The structure of each subchapter, respectively, the key group 
follows the same framework. Firstly, the opportunities are valued according to a 
customer value analysis. The (4.2.1) investors’ and (4.2.2) borrowers’ opportunities 
evaluation relies on the specific preferences defined in 3. methodology. Therefore, both 
hexagons contain an approximation of the particular prioritization in order to find 
important P2P features. In addition, P2P lending advances are visualized by estimating 
the current state of a universal bank’s services. In doing so, the benefits of P2P lending 
are defined as the optimum (outer line of the hexagon) due to the fact that only P2P 
advantages are considered. The (4.2.3) platforms’ evaluation consists only of an 
illustration of the competitive advantage. In a second step, each risk is classified based 
on a severity and frequency table and visualized in a matrix. The following tables 3 and 
4 show the assessment criteria for evaluating each risk event. 
 
Severity class Description 
Irrelevant No relevant damage or additional costs 
Minor -Failure results in minor system/process damage 
-Minor property damage 
-Potential adverse investor’s reaction 
-Potential reputational damage 
-Small costs/losses 
Major -Failure results in major system/process damage 
-Partially property damage 
-Partially retreat of customers  
-Partially reputational damage 
-Additional costs/losses 
Critical -Critical operational disruptions 
-Critical property damage 
-Major customer’s retreat 
-Reputational damage 
-High additional costs/losses 
Catastrophic -Possible shutdown of platform 
-Major property damage  
-Customer panic 
-Loss of confidence 
-Huge money losses 
Table 3: Severity description in dependence on (Posth, n.d.-c, p. 26) 
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Since there is no similar risk analysis for the P2P lending market the difficulty was to 
clearly distinguish each severity class and to cover most of the possible impact for each 
stakeholder group. Moreover, there is no data found to clearly associate the real-life 
impacts of such risk events. Since it is a digitally-based business there are other 
concerns than for example property or environmental damage in case of a chemical 
explosion. However, trust is a major element in this young market and therefore is 
reflected in investor’s reaction and reputational impact. In addition, a platform needs to 
deal also with system or process failures and in turn, may generate huge money losses. 
Investors and borrower major risk impacts are seen in mistrust and money losses. 
 
Frequency class Description 
Frequent Once per month or more often 
Probable Once per year 
Occasional Once per 10 years 
Remote Once per 100 years 
Very unlikely Once per 1’000 years or more seldom 
Table 4: Frequency description in dependence on (Posth, n.d.-c, p. 27) 
The distinction of frequency classes was not that difficult due to the fact that these 
probabilities are basic indicators of a risk analysis. Nevertheless, the challenge was to 
accurately identify the frequencies of the different risk events given that a database was 
not available. Thus, the differentiation is fully based on the existing literature. 
 
4.2.1 Investors evaluation 
Investors are a key stakeholder due to their money provision which is, in fact, a main 
element of the P2P lending business model. At current state P2P investments have 
become of major interest by reason of higher return possibilities, which is presently rare 
in a low interest environment. In addition, marketplace lenders ace through low costs 
and high comfort conditions. Nevertheless, investors are bearing credit and investment 
risk by themselves, which may cause tremendous losses. Furthermore, platform risks 
and market risks need to be kept in mind as well. The following paragraphs examine 
these conditions further. 
 
Opportunities 
For an investor cost and return are of main importance when it comes to an investment. 
It is the driver for customer value and therefore, main weights are given to these factors. 
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Considering figure 13 all advantages for a P2P investor, which has been identified from 
the literature, are distributed along a hexagon. The outer blue line represents a 
marketplace lender as the optimum since all advantages are based on its business model. 
It means that five is the maximum and therefore the best rating whereas one is the 
worst. The red line associates an approximation of investors prioritization out of the 
various benefits. Further, the yellow line constitutes another approximation of the 
banks’ current provision. In the broader sense, the hexagon illustrates a competitive 
advantage on the part of a marketplace lender compared to a bank. 
 
Figure 13: Investors‘ opportunities evaluation (Created by the author) 
Starting with the customer prioritization for an investor, main opportunities are seen in 
the high return possibilities, low-cost structure and the fast processing time. Comparing 
it to a universal bank these benefits are a competitive advantage of a P2P lending 
platform. Nevertheless, the 24 hours 7 days opportunity is regarded as medium 
important due to the fact that P2P market conditions do not change that quickly and 
once an investment is done a lender does use the platform for checking purposes. 
Meaning, an investor might not need to use the full around-the-clock service because of 
less time pressure. A bank does not meet a 24 hours availability due to fixed office 
hours. However, with the provision of the internet or mobile banking independence is 
given to a certain degree. When considering the overall service experience a bank is a 
strong competitor. A bank does not only provide professional and personal advisory but 
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to elucidate possible risks and to assess different risk appetites and capacities when 
investing. Moreover, bank clients in Europe are protected with a deposit guarantee by 
law. Nevertheless, some services might not be in an investor’s interests in particular 
when considering cost factors. Lastly, automated processes are considered of higher 
importance due to the fact that investors are exposed to greater risk such as cluster risk, 
which can be mitigated through an automated placement order. Another example where 
automated processes benefit an investor is the standardized credit assessment approach. 
If the majority of the literature holds true, a more accurate prediction of credits defaults 
prevents investors from losses. 
 
Risks 
The literature-based investor risks are measured according to the criteria severity and 
frequency in table 4. In table 5 the results are visualized in a matrix where only the 
principal risk type is approximated. With the colorized categories low, medium and 





Credit Risk (CR) 
Default Major Occasional 
Delinquency Minor Probable 
Investment risks (IR) 
Liquidity risk Minor Occasional 
Cluster risk Minor Occasional 
Platform risk (PR) 
Shutdown Major Frequent 
Insolvency Critical Occasional 
Fraud Major Frequent 
Disclosure Minor Frequent 
Market risk (MR) 
Interest rate/currency change Major Occasional 
Table 5: Investor severity and frequency table (Created by the author) 
Firstly, the credit risk which is seen as the main risk type for an investor is considered. 
The reader should consider that the default and delinquency risk in this thesis is based 
on the assumption that an investor invests in different projects of the same platform. 
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Otherwise, when putting money into P2P projects of different platforms, the 
probabilities are even more complex to asses. The estimation is based on the two 
marketplace lenders, Zopa (UK) and Funding Circle, which are rare examples for 
disclosing default rates. Zopa has an average default rate of approximately 4% per year 
whereas Funding Circle (2019-b) has an average of 6% for the last three years. The risk 
for an investor is therefore assumed to be rather low and thus estimated to happen once 
per ten years. However, depending on diversification the loss of a defaulted borrower 
can be of major or critical impact. Delinquency is estimated to be more frequent but 
with less impact because a borrower might just have a one-time payment shortage. In 
the case of a secondary market, liquidity and cluster risk can be mitigated afterward. 
Moreover, the usage of an automated placement order diminishes the cluster risk. For 
these reasons, the severity of investment risk is estimated to be minor. However, it can 
shortly turn into a critical risk in case an investor is not aware of it. Additionally, it is 
assumed to happen occasionally. Taking platform risk into account shut down and fraud 
risks are of major severity. According to Cashare (2019) in the event of a platform 
shutdown, the continuation is guaranteed through an external back-up partner. Based on 
Hill (2019) banks’ IT failures have occurred at Barclays UK 41 times in a nine-month 
period while Yorkshire bank suffered from just one incident. A shutdown like a lot of 
investors are facing in China means great uncertainty about the invested money and 
whether it is paid back. A low level of regulations may exacerbate such concerns. 
Disregarding China and focusing more on the proceedings in the United States, Europe 
or India, the frequency is valued to be frequent to probable with minor to major impacts 
for investors. This opinion is based on the introduction of certain standards and market 
entry barriers in these countries. Fraud occurring on the part of the platform is estimated 
to be probable since the P2P lending business is rather young. Several incidents are 
discussed in this thesis such as shutdowns of unserious platforms in China or low-
quality loans at Lending Club (US). Such events can be of major impact. Nevertheless, 
with strict regimes and requirements, there might be fewer fraud incidents in the future. 
A statistic about P2P lending platform insolvencies has not been covered in the 
literature yet. However, in the most instances, it is written about possible consequences 
during a crisis respectively recession. Therefore, the occurrence is estimated to be 
occasional whereas the severity can be critical depending if a resolution plan is 
implemented or not. Disclosure standards are at the time of writing not introduced and 
therefore a frequent risk source. However, due to various mitigation possibilities and 
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regulatory regimes disclosure is of minor impact. Last, heavy changes in the market 
occur occasionally whereas small changes appear more frequent. Unless it is not a 
financial crisis occasional changes impact an investor on a minor or major level. 
The following table 6 visualizes the evaluated main risk categories and indicates the risk 




Severity of consequences 
Irrelevant Minor Major Critical Catastrophic 
Frequent      
Probable      
Occasional      
Remote      
Very unlikely      
      
  Low risk Medium risk High risk  
Table 6: Investor severity and frequency matrix (Created by the author) 
Conspicuously, credit and platform risk are the ones which need to be most regarded. 
Especially, when it comes to a platform shutdown or insolvency and no resolution plan 
is introduced, the consequences can be very critical to catastrophic. The development of 
regulations, like the case in China, is also a driver of vital importance. Market risk is 
presented to be of medium risk. However, market risk can suddenly transform into a 
critical or catastrophic severity depending on the degree and sort of the crisis. 
Investment risk is very dependent on the investor’s risk understanding and the 
platform’s condition. Due to the fact, that this risk can be easier mitigated or prevented 
it is of low-risk level. 
 
4.2.2 Borrowers evaluation  
The borrower is the indirect counterpart of the investor and therefore another key 
stakeholder of the platform. The platform offers capital access for minorities, which 
may have no other financing source. Besides this key advantage, borrowers profit from 
a convenient service, flexibility and low costs. Nevertheless, benefits often bring along 
drawbacks in other areas. Major impacts are anticipated from the market and the 
platform. The following paragraphs reveal an in-depth opportunities analysis (figure 14) 









The identified opportunities are on one hand the capital access, which is the main driver 
in the P2P lending business. It is seen as the basic benefit whereas, on the other hand, 
flexibility and low costs are additional benefits. The convenience consisting of fast 
processing time, 24 hours and 7 days access and standardized processes additionally 
supplements those advantages. In figure 14 all the benefits are arranged in a hexagon. 
The blue line is associated with the optimum a P2P lender provides. The red line 
represents the benefits a borrower attaches importance to. It is an approximation where 
one means low interest and five the highest interest. The yellow line visualizes an 
approximation of the current bank provisions and severs as a supportive comparison. 
 
Figure 14: Borrowers' opportunities evaluation (Created by the author) 
The key advantage, capital provision, is also valued as priority number one of P2P 
lending customers. A bank rejection may lead to the only possibility to apply for a P2P 
loan in order to finance a borrower’s project. In addition, through a low-cost model, 
platform providers found a way to service a niche market. When available, borrowers 
have great flexibility through amortization and prematurely redemption options within a 
P2P loan. Therefore, borrowers can lower or save interest rate costs. Another big ranked 
opportunity is the web-based 24/7 availability and fast processing time where the debtor 
profits from receiving money in a speedy manner. It is useful in the event of a liquidity 
shortage but on a normal course of life not absolutely necessary. Automated processes 
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due to questionable inputs, which may discriminate debtors. Comparing a bank’s 
business model, it shows that a bank is a huge capital provider, but only to selected 
segments. When comparing it with P2P loans, without collaterals, banks or other 
financial institutions offer mostly higher-priced loans. With the provision of the internet 
or mobile banking, banks have established more flexibility and freedom for customers 
but not at the same level as marketplace lenders are doing. The same applies to 
automated and fast processes. Nevertheless, banks offer other qualities such as customer 
service and personal advisory in different aspects of life, which outweigh the P2P 




Borrower risks are discovered in market changes and platform decisions. These impacts 
to borrowers are assessed in table 7 according to their frequency and severity and 
further summarized in table 8 the severity and frequency matrix. The matrix 
representation helps to determine low, medium and high-risk categories. According to 
the interviewee Cashare (2019) relevant risks for borrowers are not really existing in a 





Market risk (MR) 
Interest rate/currency change Major Occasional 
Platform risk (PR) 
Poor credit assessment Catastrophic Occasional/remote 
Rejection Major Frequent 
Transparency Minor Frequent 
Table 7: Borrower severity and frequency table (Created by the author) 
In table 7, the first risk category to evaluate is market risk, which happens occasionally 
and with minor severity. Borrowers are affected by similar market risk characteristics as 
investors are. In the event of a crisis, the impact can be critical or even catastrophic. 
However, small but frequent changes do not need to worry a borrower. However, the 
literature did not cover the risk involved nor the procedure when a loan cannot be 
repaid, and the maturity needs to be extended. If interest rates have not changed much, 
Practical framework 
 45 
it is believed that an extension or a second request for the initial loan can be easily 
conducted. However, if the interest rates have increased in such a way the borrower 
cannot afford or bear the initial credit amount anymore, a continuation of the loan might 
not be possible. Thus, the borrower might run into default. This issue is strongly 
connected with a poor credit assessment (platform risk). An accurate assessment of the 
borrowers’ credit standing implies to calculate the credit costs with a considerably 
higher implicit interest rate to ensure the borrower can still bear the cost in the event of 
an interest rate rise. The consequence of an insufficient credit assessment is valued to be 
catastrophic for a borrower. However, due to the fact that no literature has covered this 
risk, it is assumed that it is a rather rare event. Other platform risks such as rejection or 
transparency needs to be considered as well. According to Lend (2016) up to 85% of 
total loan applications are spurned in order to provide high-quality assets. However, 
there is no disclosure of the specific criteria. Additionally, due to the popularity of P2P 
lending, a borrower’s rejection is estimated to happen more than once per month. 
Further, such a decision is of major impact for a borrower due to costly or no other 
financing alternatives. The lack of disclosing detailed information is also the reason 
why transparency is valued to be frequent. Given that marketplace lending is a rather 
new market there might be some regulatory developments relating to this topic, which 





Severity of consequences 
Irrelevant Minor Major Critical Catastrophic 
Frequent      
Probable      
Occasional      
Remote      
Very unlikely      
      
  Low risk Medium risk High risk  
Table 8: Borrower severity and frequency matrix (Created by the author) 
In table 8, the matrix points out that the platform bears a higher risk for a borrower. 
Regulatory changes might scale down the platform risks, rejection and transparency, to 






standing or capacity is a medium-to-high risk factor. Similar to investors, market risk 
for borrowers is of major impact. Dependent on the market development and the 
borrower’s condition, it could potentially turn into a critical-to-catastrophic event. 
Summarizing this subchapter, it is important to mention that the evaluated borrowers’ 
risks are rather uncertainties than sources of potential losses. However, it was found to 
be appropriate to assess those uncertainties in the same manner as the others. 
 
4.2.3 Platform evaluation 
Evaluating its own opportunities and uncertainties is important in order to derive an 
appropriate strategy and to mitigate risks. The literature describes four main 
opportunities: Risk decentralization, convenience, cost structure, big data approach and 
automated processes. With the introduction of a business model with such benefits, 
marketplace lending puts pressure on banks. Nevertheless, platforms run the risk of 
reputational damage, operations and macroeconomic changes. The following 
paragraphs cover the evaluations of opportunities and risks for the last key stakeholder. 
 
Opportunities 
A key benefit is certainly that the credit risk is an off-balance sheet position. Hence, the 
risk is transferred to the investor and losses do not need to be covered by a P2P lending 
provider. The convenience is comprehensively discussed in the previous two chapters, 
4.2.1 investors evaluation and 4.2.2 borrowers’ evaluation. The cost structure is seen as 
another big benefit. Additionally, the big data approach and automated processes are 
new ways of doing a credit assessment, which further innovates the industry. In figure 
15, all the platforms opportunities are illustrated in a pentagon. The blue line is again 
the optimum and the yellow line an approximation of a bank’s circumstances. It is 




Figure 15: Platforms' opportunities evaluation (Created by the author) 
In contrast to a P2P lender, a bank keeps the whole credit risk in its own books. It is 
therefore very important to undertake a clear and accurate credit assessment of the 
borrowers in order to mitigate credit risks. Most banks request collaterals that in the 
case of default the underlying asset can be exploited. However, it causes more 
paperwork. Considering convenience, there is just a small advance of the P2P lender 
due to its all-time availability and fast processing. Taking the cost structure into account 
the literature identified currently lower operating costs in the P2P business. However, 
banks can profit from economies of scale and scope, which leads to no differentiation of 
the two. The big data approach still needs to demonstrate its superiority compared to the 
conventional approach. However, the existing literature is consistent in the assumption 
that the approach offers a more precise deviation of good and bad borrowers. 
Automated processes help to deteriorate employee failures and subjectivity. This issue 
is valued to be more distinctive for marketplace lenders. 
 
Risks 
The flip side of the opportunities is further evaluated in table 9 severity and frequency 
table as well as table 10 the matrix. Reputational damage is one type of risk, which can 
be caused by external or internal events. Internal default rates and default rates from 
other market players as well as misbehavior creates an environment of mistrust for P2P 
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Moreover, operational risks are of great concern for a P2P operator as well. Those 
include inadequate processes, employee failures, legal risks or natural disaster. 
Additionally, a P2P business entry in times of expansion may get strongly affected in 





Reputational damage (RD) 
Internal default rates Major Probable 
Misbehavior of other players Minor Occasional 
Mistrust of customers Catastrophic Occasional 
Operational risk (OpR) 
Inadequate processes/systems Catastrophic Occasional 
Employee fraud/failures Minor Probable 
Legal risks Critical Probable 
Natural disaster Minor Very unlikely 
Macroeconomic changes (MC) 
Recession Critical Occasional 
Table 9: Platform severity and frequency table (Created by the author) 
Firstly, internal default rates are important indicators when dealing with credits. It 
signals how accurate and serious the credit assessment is executed and therefore greatly 
influences the reputation, respectively, the continuation of a platform. Based on a few 
default rate publications, the effect of internal default rates is probable with major 
impact. Nonetheless, when the market has settled and default rates on an acceptable 
low, the impact can be reduced to minor. However, in times of a crisis the negative 
effect might reinforce reputational damage. Since the lifecycle of the P2P lending 
business is rather young, default rates and misbehavior of other players impact all 
platforms. However, external effects are valued to be less frequent and less intense. 
Furthermore, trust is the cornerstone of every business activity. It is hard to regain lost 
trust due to the misuse of data. In a wort-case scenario, it could implicate the end of the 
company. Hence, the probability that such an event occurs is currently higher than in a 
stable market. In fact, the risk is expected to happen once every ten years and in a 
mature market once every 100 years. In any case, losing trust is a catastrophe. Going 
deeper into operational risks, inadequate processes or systems can also have a 
catastrophic impact due to the fact that a P2P lending platform heavily relies on the 
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implied technology. Frequency wise, smaller system or process failures are expected to 
happen once per year while heavy ones might happen once per 100 years. Small but 
frequent interruptions are already estimated in 4.2.1 investors evaluation. Due to the fact 
that probably most online providers possess back-up systems by third-parties, small 
impacts are expected. Employee failures and fraud happen in every company. However, 
the P2P processes are mostly standardized and automated with less human 
interventions. Therefore, there might happen fewer failures. That is why those risks are 
estimated to be probable with minor effects. Probable irrelevant failures do not need to 
be considered. Again, due to the early stage of the P2P business, there are currently 
higher legal risks involved than in a later stage. Taking China into account, regulatory 
changes can critically affect businesses and is currently very probable. In the future, 
such a risk event might slow down when the environment is stable. A natural disaster is 
of minor impact due to the web-based service provision and very unlikely to happen. 
However, the continuation needs to be guaranteed in case the main server is damaged. 
Macroeconomic changes are expected approximately every ten years and are critical for 
a platform due to a potential increase of default rates. For P2P lending companies, 




Severity of consequences 
Irrelevant Minor Major Critical Catastrophic 
Frequent      
Probable      
Occasional      
Remote      
Very unlikely      
      
  Low risk Medium risk High risk  
Table 10: Platform severity and frequency matrix (Created by the author) 
Table 10 illustrates the risk intensity of the explained risks. It can be observed that 
reputation is a high-risk factor, which is mainly due to its late introduction on the 
market. Employee fraud and failures, as well as natural disaster, are a low-risk category 
whereas inadequate processes or systems and legal risks are high-risk categories. 
Macroeconomic changes are expected to heavily affect platforms and are among the 








Chapter 5, discussion, summarizes the findings of chapter 4 and puts it in conversation. 
Accordingly, the aim is to get to the bottom of the results and challenge these. As a 
result, the discussion part consists of a critical assessment of this thesis’ research 
question and may help for future research directions. 
 
The practical framework started with the evaluation of key stakeholders. In the first 
step, investors, borrowers, competitors, partners and regulators were evaluated 
according to four dimensions. The utilized approach of Varvasovszky and Brugha 
(2000) is a rather new approach, which leads to a timely evaluation. Nevertheless, such 
a qualitative assessment leaves room for interpretation. As mentioned several times, due 
to the limited availability of data, a literature-based approach is found to be the most 
suited. However, the evaluation is a general view without any country-specific 
differences such as regulatory, ethical or cultural issues. Country-specific attributes 
might influence such an evaluation and can lead to a different result. Nevertheless, the 
general evaluation gives good ground for a deeper understanding of powerful 
stakeholders. The prioritization of key groups further justified the decision to continue 
the analysis with a focus on the three main groups. 
 
The main part of this thesis, which consists of the assessment of investors, borrowers 
and platforms according to their opportunities and risks, serves as a sound foundation 
for the discussion part. The approaches used for evaluating opportunities and risks are 
based on a customer value and severity and frequency classification, retrieved from 
Meffert et al. (2012) and Posth (n.d.-c). Both approaches were used due to the fact that 
those were felt to be most representative and accurate. However, the main weights are 
given to the risk estimation because of a greater impact. Nevertheless, it was difficult to 
apply them to web-based services without any physical products or personal contact. 
However, both approaches used might be affected by a lack of robustness. While 
researching, the author has faced limited access to scientific literature for a specific 
topic. In other words, no papers about detailed P2P country specifications, investors 
prioritization when investing in P2P or different borrower characteristics/preferences 
when choosing a credit, has been found. Primarily, the evaluation of the opportunities 
was affected by the inexistence of such information. Nonetheless, the author has taken 
advantage of the model’s implied scope for interpretation. Therefore, in order to fit the 
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model characteristics for a typical investor, borrower and a credit bank have been 
defined (3. methodology). 
 
Going deeper into the investors’ evaluation, the opportunities are chosen based on the 
literature and judged according to its statements. Investors main benefits are seen in 
profitable investment opportunities, which can be generated on a low-cost and 
convenient basis. Consequently, these customers are also engaged in high risks. The 
credit risk relies fully on investors and therefore they need to screen and pick their 
assets wisely. In real life, however, it is not as simple as it sounds because disclosure 
standards are not legally defined and inexperienced investors might not assess the risk-
return profile of a project properly and could potentially take on too much risk. 
Comparing it to a traditional bank investment, client advisors are forced to assess the 
risk appetite and capacity and therefore suggest investments according to it. In a P2P 
environment, investors might just be driven by high returns without considering the risk 
of a total loss. Besides the credit risk, investors are facing other platform risks such as 
fraud, insolvency or shutdowns. Those risks, however, are predicted to be of minor 
severity in the future due to a potential introduction of a tighter regulatory framework. 
India is a good example of how regulations positively impacted the young P2P business. 
When unserious or uninformed businesses are cleaned up from the market, like it is 
conducted in China, trust can be built up. Trust has demonstrated to be of major 
importance when taking investors into account. Only a trustful and serious platform can 
attract investors. Furthermore, market risks affect the whole financial industry and are 
sometimes inevitable. Nonetheless, it is possible to minimize it through proper 
diversification. Those losses are not given to much attention to, due to the fact that it is 
a common risk and not a specific P2P lending risk. Though, liquidity risk is specific for 
a P2P investment due to the fact that exit options are limited. To conclude this section, 
investors profit from higher return opportunities but also bear higher risks compared to 
commercial investments. An investor needs to be aware of these aspects and carefully 
screen the market. Nevertheless, the evaluation neither considers any differences in 
investors experiences respectively skills nor the influence of cultural differences. 
Additionally, economic discrepancies of countries may influence the results as well. 
 
The chances for borrowers are clearly seen in the additional or only capital access. Peer-
to-peer lending providers offer inexpensive, comfortable and flexible financing to 
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privates and companies. Thus, an innovative business model entered a niche market. 
Besides that, a low-interest environment and the provision of possible securities as 
collaterals benefits a bank, which may offer more attractive loans. According to the 
interview with Cashare there are no risks involved for debtors. However, the thesis 
identified two risk categories. Firstly, market risk, which is a common risk for all kinds 
of borrowers. Apart from that, platform risk is another source of uncertainty. However, 
rejection and transparency do not really end up in a loss but rather affect mutual trust. 
The uncertainty about input factors in the credit assessment process and the lack of 
transparency may foster mistrust. However, it currently seems that the need for 
financing outweighs the ignorance of detailed information disclosure. Nevertheless, 
when the market is settled and the demand for disclosure increases, the pressure might 
be so high that the requirements need to be met. Otherwise, the loss of confidence could 
be the consequence which can affect the whole business operations. The risk of a poorly 
assessed credit standing and capacity of a borrower is another risk factor identified by 
the author, which leads to a huge borrower loss. However, the majority of the literature 
has not covered such risks, which can be explained by the topics’ novelty or the rarity of 
such risks. 
 
A platform’s benefits and risks were also of great interest due to the fact that further 
challenges for the whole market could be identified. The most significant advantage in 
comparison to the traditional banking model is the risk transfer to investors. In contrast, 
it means that there need to be investors who are willing to accept these credit risks. At 
current state, this must be the case because of higher return opportunities for the risk 
taken or due to ignorance. Another much-discussed benefit is the big data approach. The 
majority of the literature argues that the P2P credit assessment is more accurate and 
comprehensive than the one provided by traditional banks. However, there are still 
some opposite opinions about this topic. Cashare states that their company, which was 
founded in 2008, already was confronted with a downturn. Additionally, since the 
establishment, they reported consistently positive net performance. According to 
interviewee, however, in times of recession higher default rates are expected. During 
such events diversification becomes crucial. Although this thesis investigated in 
comparing the innovative P2P and the traditional approach, further research needs to be 
done when an economic downturn is experienced. It is then possible to analyze a full 
business cycle for all the remaining platforms and to judge the big data approach. If the 
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P2P credit assessment approach proofs to more accurately deviate bad and good 
borrowers, it would mean a big advance in the credit market. It would not only benefit 
all financial institutions but also strengthen the whole credit market. 
Another debatable topic is the operational cost structure where some authors report less 
operational costs for P2P platforms and others project higher or equal costs in times of 
recession. This topic may also be worth an investigation in the future. Although 
automated processes may lead to fewer employee failures, it makes the whole business 
to rely on a well-performing technology. In terms of shutdowns or cybercrime, the 
systems and continuation of the services must be guaranteed and thus a platform 
necessarily needs resolution plans and back-up provisions. Another important 
operational risk is evaluated for regulatory regimes. At current times, legal changes are 
very probable since it is a rather new business model. The influence on the business is 
therefore high as seen in China, where the majority of platforms had to be shut down. 
Nevertheless, such a radical approach restored trust among investors and borrowers, 
which creates a good foundation for future business. However, it is a high-risk category 
and risk management strategies are crucial and must be implemented. Lastly, a good 
reputation is seen as an essential element in a fast-growing environment where the 
actions of all players can have severe consequences on the reputation of the whole niche 
market. This point of view is further supported by Cashare, which states that they are 
mainly affected by operational risk but also reputational damage in the event of 
insufficient credit scoring. 
 
To conclude the discussion part, figure 16 shortly summarizes the major aspects 
respectively the challenges in the current marketplace lending environment. It provides 
critical issues, which at the time of writing cannot be precisely analyzed or where 




Figure 16: Challenges in marketplace lending (Created by the author) 
Trust is found to be of major importance in such a young fast-growing business. The 
case of Lending Club showed how strongly a platform can get affected when trust is 
misused. On the contrary, India demonstrated how trust can be built up by introducing 
regulatory regimes. It is the basis to overcome challenges such as increasing positive 
awareness, expansion and equal growth of investors and borrowers. However, 
regulations are usually accompanied by a lot of changes and costs to meet the 
requirements. Nevertheless, norms and rules are also drivers that enhance trust. 
Furthermore, disclosing more details about credit quality and the involved risk, is 
necessary in order to provide investors with sufficient information to make informed 
investment decisions. Despite that, the introduction of common disclosure standards 
seems currently to be a challenging task for regulators and supervisors. This goes along 
with a detailed declaration of the input factors for the borrower’s credit assessment. A 
full economic cycle is of great interest due to the fact that further investigations can be 
conducted, and more precise reasoning can be drawn. Lastly, keeping a positive 
reputation represents a major challenge not only for the provider itself but rather for the 
P2P market as a whole. 














The conclusion provides a final short summary (6.1) about major concerns and 
implications of results (6.2). It suggests future research directions and where more in-
depth analysis can be done. Furthermore, in 6.3 a short outlook is provided, which 
amplify a tendency in the future. 
 
6.1 Summary 
Marketplace lending is a rather new business model which gained worldwide significant 
popularity. It provides access to inexpensive capital to borrowers with limited financing 
possibilities. Moreover, P2P lending offers lucrative annualized returns for investors 
who are seeking profitable investment opportunities. The intermediation of investor and 
borrower happens in a very time and cost-efficient manner and is based on cutting-edge 
technology. Additionally, there are less strict regulations when comparing it to 
traditional financial institutions. However, there are newly introduced legal schemes 
like investment amount limitation, registration or disclosure standards. In comparison to 
commercial investments at a traditional bank, P2P lending offers higher profit 
opportunities. However, higher returns simultaneously imply higher risks for the 
investor. In particular, investors are involved in credit, platform, investment and market 
risk. Fundamental measures are therefore diversification (project and platform wise) and 
assessing a risk-return profile in order to be aware of the potential loss. Debtors are not 
really affected by significant losses, however, an inadequate and unprofessional credit 
assessment leads to borrower default and a huge loss. The P2P platform itself benefit 
from decentralized credit risk, low-cost structure and automated processes. Nonetheless, 
there exist uncertainties mainly occurring due to its pioneer status. Market, reputational 
and operational risks are crucial concerns for P2P lending providers and need to be 
managed. In order to mitigate some of the risks platforms are advised to introduce 
contingency plans. Altogether there are several benefits for all key parties but also high-
risk factors, which all parties involved need to be aware of.  
 
6.2 Implications of results 
The thesis showed not only the benefits but also the major risk drivers in marketplace 
lending. Investors main benefits are high profits and low costs whereas they need to 
deal with P2P-specific losses like credit and platform risks. Borrowers’ main advantage 
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is the access to financing alternatives in a cost- and time efficient manner. Additionally, 
major risk drivers are identified such as being rejected by a platform, transparency, poor 
credit assessment and market risk. The platforms competitive advantage is seen in the 
provision of standardized, cost and time efficient solutions. However, dealing with 
reputational and operational risks is of major concern. Nevertheless, the main 
implication of marketplace lending for key stakeholders is enhancing trust. Trust is 
found to be the cornerstone of the whole business activity not only for P2P lending but 
also for the whole financial industry. However, P2P lending is rather newly introduced 
whereas a bank relies on a long tradition. The introduction of necessary requirements by 
law successful financing outcomes would create a sound foundation for future business 
activities. The findings help to better understand the benefits and the drawbacks of the 
three key parties. Furthermore, the thesis informs P2P customers about obscure aspects, 
which needs to be solved. In other words, it illustrates the issues which need to be 
managed by P2P platforms and demonstrates the improvement potential. The 
stakeholder analysis shows the power and impact of various groups and where strategies 
need to be developed. Overall, it is believed that currently, the risks do not outweigh the 
rewards, which is also partly justified by the tremendous demand for P2P loans. 
Nevertheless, this young market will face a lot of changes in the future and therefore 
trust needs to be further enhanced in order to give good ground for doing business. 
 
6.3 Outlook 
Marketplace lending is expected to be very present in the future and to supplement the 
traditional banking model. It is imageable that more cooperation between banks and 
marketplace lenders takes place, which could strengthen the credit market or even the 
whole economy. Both, banks and P2P platforms can profit from each other through 
innovative technology on the one hand and on the other hand through long-term 
experiences. The results help to solve key issues for either one party or for the whole 
P2P market. Due to the novelty of marketplace lending a full credit cycle needs to be 
experienced in order to further investigate this topic. Specifically, it is interesting to 
examine and compare the development of the different cost structures within a full 
credit cycle. Further, finding qualitative proof for the accuracy of the P2P credit 
assessment could be another research target. Overall, the future will reveal whether 
marketplace lending disrupts the credit market or if it is just a current trend. The 
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9.1 Cashare email interview 
Von: Cashare Support (Cashare - Support) support@cashare.ch
Betreff: [Cashare - Support] Betreff: Masterarbeit Interviewanfrage
Datum: 20. Mai 2019 um 17:42
An: Gmail
##- Bitte geben Sie Ihre Antwort über dieser Zeile ein. -##
Ihre Anfrage (9500) wurde aktualisiert. Um zusätzliche Kommentare hinzuzufügen, antworten Sie
auf diese E-Mail.
Cashare Support (Cashare - Support)
20. Mai, 17:42 CEST
Guten Frau Berliat
Gerne beantworten wir Ihre Fragen nachstehend:
1) Der traditionelle Zwischenhandel über die Banken entfällt und führt  für
die Kreditnehmer und Kreditgeber zu attraktiveren Zinskonditionen. Bereits
heute kann beobachtet werden, dass die Zinsen für Konsumkredite seit dem
Einstieg von Crowdlending stark gesunken sind zu Gunsten der
Kreditnehmer. Natürlich hat dies auch mit dem Gesetz zum maximalen
Zinssatz zu tun, aber nicht nur. Für Cashare als Fintech-Pionier ist es eine
grosse Chance, diesen Markt weiter aufzubauen.
2) Für Kreditnehmer sehen wir keine Risiken. Kreditgeber haben ein höheres
Risiko von einem Verlust auf Ihrer Anlage, als bei traditionellen Banken mit
Einlagensicherung. Entsprechend wichtig ist, dass das Ertrags-/Risiko-Ratio
gut ist und die Anlagen breit diversifiziert werden. Cashare selber hat
hauptsächlich unternehmerische Risiken zu tragen und sowie das
Reputationsrisiko, wenn das Scoring nicht gut sein sollte.
3) Ja, Es gibt börsenkotierte Unternehmen, die die Abwicklung des
Kreditportfolios übernehmen würden.
4) Im Gegensatz zu möglichen Konkurrenten, wurde Cashare bereits 2008
gegründet und ist somit schon durch ganze Wirtschaftszyklen konfrontiert
gewesen. Wir konnten mit unserem Modell auf dem gesamten Kreditbuch in
jedem Jahr eine positive Nettoperformance ausweisen. Natürlich führen
aber schlechtere Wirtschafszeiten zu tendenziell höheren Ausfallsquoten,
weshalb ein ausgeglichenes und breit diversifiziertes Portfolio an Kredite
gemäss der persönlichen Risikoneigung elementar ist.
5) Der Fokus liegt sicherlich auf der Steigerung des Bekanntheitsgrades von





Cashare und dem Modell. Ebenso wichtig ist für eine Plattform, ein
möglichst ausgeglichenes Wachstum auf beiden Zielgruppen (Anleger und
Kreditnehmern) zu erreichen. Abschliessend ist eine grössere Challenge
sicherlich auch die Expansion in weitere Länder. 
Wir hoffen Ihnen mit diesen Antworten gedient zu haben und wünschen




13. Mai, 17:17 CEST
Guten Tag Frau Aellen
Vielen Dank für Ihre Antwort. Ich nehme das Angebot sehr gerne an und
sende Ihnen darum die untenstehenden Fragen:
1. Wo sehen Sie die grössten Chancen für Kreditnehmer / Investoren /
Cashare?
2. Wo sehen Sie die grössten Risiken für Kreditnehmer / Investoren /
Cashare?
3. Operationelle Risiken: Ist Cashare im Falle eines Plattformausfalls
vorbereitet? Wie?
4. Was denken Sie wie Cashare in Zeiten eines
Konjunkturwechsels/Rezession (höhere Zinsen, sinkende Ausgaben, höhere
Arbeitslosenrate etc.) performen wird? Gibt es dazu Massnahmen?
5. Wo sehen Sie die grössten Challenges für Cashare?
Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre Hilfe und Bemühungen.
Freundliche Grüsse
Rahel Berliat




Cashare Support (Cashare - Support)
13. Mai, 13:06 CEST
Sehr geehrte Frau Berliat
Besten Dank für Ihr Interesse an unserer Plattform. Leider müssen wir Ihnen
mitteilen, dass wir seit einiger Zeit von Anfragen bezüglich Hilfe bei
Diplom-, Bachelor- und Masterarbeiten förmlich "überschwemmt" werden.
Unsere Ressourcen lassen leider eine längere Mithilfe nicht zu. Deshalb
haben wir uns dazu entschlossen, bei interessanten Themen zumindest 3-5
Fragen schriftlich zu beantworten, sofern es uns möglich ist. Gerne bieten






10. Mai, 12:54 CEST
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren
Ich bin eine Banking and Finance Masterstudentin an der Zürcher 
Fachhochschule (ZHAW) in Winterthur. Ich schreibe meine Masterarbeit über 
P2P lending und bin durch meine Recherchearbeit immer wieder auf Ihre 
Plattform gestossen. Da ich mich sehr für das Model von Cashare 
interessiere möchte ich Sie gerne anfragen, ob Sie bereit wären mit mir ein 
Interview durchzuführen.
Das Interview handelt sich hauptsächlich um die Chancen und Risiken des 
P2P lendings für die involvierten Parteien wie Kreditnehmer, Investoren und 
die Plattform selber. Zudem ist ein kurzer Teil über die 
Informationsbereitstellung, d.h. Kreditnehmerauswahlverfahren, Festlegung 
des Ratings und Zins sowie das Signaling an die Investoren.




9.2 P2P lending mind map 
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-Borrowers: Municipalities, cities & cantons, 0.01% p.a. fee
-Lenders: Institutional investors, no fee's
-Volume: CHF 500'000-500 Mio.









































































Uncertainties / Risks Platform
New market entries










Conflict of interest of top managers
Mismatch of poor credits and
investor's requirements
Loss of trust of investors





























Reasons for preferring P2P credits






Young existence Difficult for judging the influence forend-customer and economy
